“[T]he famous ‘3:1 rule,’ according to which the attacker and defender suffer equal fractional loss rates at a 3:1 force ratio if the battle is in mixed terrain and the defender enjoys ‘prepared’ defenses…”
D
Deleted member 84247
Why do you hate the rule? I have only seen it applied in a few novels. That's why I didn't immediately know what you were talking about.
Because it is so completely and utterly wrong in every way ... It is painful. The guys who wrote it must have been high.
D
Deleted member 84247
There are a lot of factors involved in a battle, so it does seem pretty useless. Battle tactics are probably the most important thing. It reminds me of trench warfare. There is not much tactic involved in trying to charge the other person's trench, so usually that doesn't go well.
Not sure that I agree. Taking a trench requires some sophistication. But more importantly, the attack always gets through. The question is the price.
D
Deleted member 84247
Well, it is a numbers thing in trench warfare. It also depends on the distance, but at any distance 1 person vs 1 person the entrenched will have an advantage across an open field.
The so-called “3-1 rule” is a military aphorism that holds that attacking forces require a 3 to 1 advantage over defending forces in order to succeed. Although this rule has become widely-known and widely-held, especially in Western militaries, its origin is unknown and unattributed.
[W]hat is the force ratio to be used with the 3:1 force ratio planning factor? Is it numbers of men, or weapons? Is it firepower? Is it some other calculation of a combat power ratio? In any event, it is clear that neither numbers nor firepower tells us much unless we know the circumstances under which these numbers face each other and the manner in which the firepower is applied.
In 1984, Dupuy’s Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) compiled a database of battles from 1600 to 1973 for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA; now known as the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis). CAA’s examination of the numerical force ratios in the database showed that attackers with advantages of 3-1 or more in manpower succeeded 74% of the time.
It also showed that attackers won between 58% and 63% of the time when attacking with between a 1.5-1 numerical disadvantage and less than a 3-1 advantage. Attackers also managed to obtain a manpower advantage of 3-1 or greater in just 106 of 598 cases (17.7%) examined.